Niepewność bywa czasem gorsza niż brak uzbrojonej straży.

It is not an accident that again religion and nationalism grow together, and that, directly or indirectly, they influence each other. The plural form should be used while describing current Polish-Ukrainian borderlands. It is justified to distinguish at least three such borderlands. First, it is a historical or traditional borderland in South-Eastern Poland and Western Ukrainê. In this area Poles and Ukrainians met and intermingled during last several centuries. It was predominately rural area and social relations were mainly typical of a local peasant society. Historically there were also class and social divisions, with Poles being at a top of social stratification and Ukrainians usually at lower levels. This situation did change considerably after world war two. In this same geographical area one can also distinguish a second Polish-Ukrainian social and cultural borderland — an urban one, currently in Poland mostly in Przemyœl (voivodship town). Social and political relations between the two national groups in an urban area are considerably different than those in traditional rural communities. The third Polish-Ukrainian borderland is relatively new, it was developed after 1947, when the majority of Ukrainians from South-Eastern Poland were forcibly resettled to the northern and western part of the country and dispersed. For morê that ten years they were prohibited from return to their homeland, and even later on, when this ban was formally lifted, they faced many difficulties while trying to return. Many Ukrainians managed to return, but many had remained in the new settlement and created morê or less stable communities, with schools, religious communities and some organizational network. 272 Polish-Ukrainian borderland is generally a national borderland. It means that in this area members of two fully developed nations meet. But nation-building processes are seldom fully completed. National identification and national consciousness, as well as national ideologies are in the process of constant transfor-mation. During the last century there were many historical, political and social changes, which considerably influenced the national consciousness of both Poles and Ukrainians in this area. Ukrainian national awakening was later than Polish and — particularly in Galicia under Austrian dominance in the second half of the XIX century — it was built around the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church, and in opposition to Polish national, cultural and economic dominance. Greek Catholic Church was perceived by the Ukrainians as their national church, with opposition to the Roman Catholic Church, treated as Polish, but also to East Orthodox Church, often perceived by part of them as Russian. After World War Two Polish-Ukrainian relations changed dramatically. Change of borders and mass resettlements of people (morê often forced rather than voluntary), resulted in the significant decrease of both minorities — Poles in the Ukrainian Soviet Republic (USSR) and Ukrainians in Poland. Despite these change Polish-Ukrainian borderland has remained a geographical and cultural space, in which members of two nations, finally fully independent after 1991, are in everyday contact. This borderland is considerably different from that before 1939. Before WWII Poles and Ukrainians were in the situation of „objective conflict". Ukrainians struggled for their independent national state, while Poles opposed these efforts, at least at the territories, which have belonged to Poland. Current Polish-Ukrainian borderland is of much morê symmetric character than it was in history. It is because: a) Poland and Ukrainê are, for the first time in the history, fully independent, sovereign countries and develop equal mutual relations, b) Ukrainian national consciousness is already developed, at least in its basie structure. This consciousness does not have to be built or rebuilt in opposition to Polish political, economic and cultural domination, c) in Polish current polities and ideology, previously visible elements of national domination over Ukrainians and national hegemony, are not present at all, d) two major elements of „structural conflict" between Poles and Ukrainians, i.e. Polish objeetions against Ukrainian political independence and economic class Polish-Ukrainian conflicts belong only to history. Political and economic bases of Polish-Ukrainian conflicts were considerably reduced. But differences have remained. In the situation when political and 273 economic reasons of conflicts were reduced, cultural and religious differences became relatively morê important. These differences do not, however, have to lead to tensions and conflicts. After 1989 considerable changes took place, but the legacy of previous period will persist probably for a long time. National identification of Ukrainians in Poland is changing, the freedom of the development of national culture is much broader, but the positive results of it would be seen only sometime in the future. Ukrainians in Poland were partially assimilated, particularly in cultural and linguistic dimensions. Their national consciousness persisted, based mainly on bitter memories of Polish dominance and ethnic discrimination. The situation of Poles in the Ukrainian Republic is in many aspects similar. In such a situation, when economic, cultural and linguistic differences are almost insignificant, religious differences became a primary factor in the process of drawing ethnic lines. The hypothesis, which was tested in empirical field research, conducted from 1994 to 1997 in the rural area near Przemyœl in Poland and between towns of Drohobycz and Moœciska in Ukrainê, was formulated as follows: in the current ethnic processes, and also in the near future, the crys-tallization of national consciousness of Ukrainians in Poland, and also of Poles in Ukrainê, would be based to a great extent on religion and religious differences. It does not mean that the role of religion in future ethnic processes will remain always so important. Other elements of national identification — language, culture, national ideology — would develop gradually, partially replacing religious identification. Empirical research were conducted in an ethnically and religiously mixed area, in the local smali town and village communities. Historically this area was of predominantly Ukrainian (Ruthenian) settlement. Poles were in minority, but up to 1939 all big land ownership was in Polish hands